Dangers of Spying on the 2024 Regional Elections: From Political Corruption to Regional Government Management

By: Mulya Sarmono, SH., MH

Correlation of Corruption and Implementation of Regional Elections

One of the "scourges" that undermines the implementation of Regional Head Elections and will again become a threat to its implementation in 2024 is political corruption. According to Hodess, political corruption is the abuse of power by political leaders by accumulating power and wealth and for personal gain. Political corruption is not only in the form of exchanging money, but also in the form of trading influence or providing facilities that poison politics and threaten democracy.¹

Furthermore, Artidjo Alkostar stated that political corruption is an action carried out by political elites or State government officials which has an impact on the political and economic conditions of the State. This action is usually carried out by people and/or parties who have positions or political positions. This political corruption can be carried out by the president, head of government, ministers of a cabinet who basically have political positions, members of parliament, can be qualified as political corruption, because the act is carried out using political facilities or facilities owned by the perpetrator. The facilities that are misused are basically a mandate or trust given by the people.²

The explanation above shows that political corruption is not just about money, but also about the use of power, facilities and conveniences obtained due to position, which are aimed at the political interests of oneself or one's group. However, political corruption in the practical political sphere is more directed towards the use of state money for candidacy purposes. Nassmacher stated that money influences politics because money is the main resource for politics that want to come to power. Mainly because money can be converted easily into various other forms of resources. Money can be used to buy goods such as campaign equipment, advertising and so on. Money is also needed to purchase services and skills, especially political services and consultancies.³

Another factor is the financing of political parties which often comes from corruption money. According to Theodore M. Smith, political parties, especially new political parties, require financing that can only be met irregularly in most low-income countries. Investing organizations and purchasing their support requires huge amounts of money, and often the only way available to obtain such working capital is to siphon it from the state.⁴

The analysis above makes it clear that the Pilkada process was carried out fraudulently, which is correlated with political corruption in a region. Data from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), for example, notes that there is a correlation between corruption and the implementation of regional elections.⁵

In ICW records in 2018, there were 11 corruption cases related to regional election contestation. Furthermore, ICW also stated that there were 10 problems that were shadowing the implementation of the Pilkada, namely:

1. Buying and selling candidacy between candidates and political parties.
2. The emergence of problematic names (former convicts or corruption suspects) and candidates with dynasties.
3. The emergence of a single candidate.
4. High cost campaigns.
5. Collection of illegal capital (buying and selling business permits, buying and selling positions, project bribes, etc.) and politicization of government programs (grant funds, social assistance, village funds and other vulnerable budgets) for campaigns.
6. Politicization of the bureaucracy and state officials, from bureaucrats, teachers, to TNI/Polri institutions.
7. Money politics (buying and selling voter votes).
8. Manipulation of campaign finance reports.
9. Bribery to election organizers.
10. Corruption for raising capital, buying and selling permits, buying and selling positions, and even budgets.⁶

Potential for Political Corruption in Regionally Owned Enterprises

In 2022, there will be 1,133 BUMD companies recorded in Indonesia, with details of 1,084 companies having active status, while 49 other companies have temporarily closed status.⁷ The company's assets in the same year were recorded at Rp. 894,532,735 with a net profit of Rp. 12,483,653. The business fields are quite diverse, ranging from agriculture, forestry and fisheries, mining, construction, transportation and warehousing, information and communications, financial and insurance activities, real estate, health services and social activities as well as various other businesses.⁸

BUMD itself generally has two types as in Article 4 Paragraph (3) PP No. 54 of 2017 concerning Regional Owned Enterprises, namely Regional Public Companies and Regional Liability Companies. The variety of types of businesses with quite large assets and net profits makes BUMD a regional company that will easily become a target for corruptors in Indonesia.

In the context of corruption cases in Indonesia, Corruption Crimes based on Institutions released by the Corruption Eradication Commission states that institutions with many corruption cases, one of which is State-Owned Enterprises/Regional-Owned Enterprises (BUMN/BUMD). In 2021, there will be 8 cases, in 2022 there will be 12 cases and in 2023 there will be 34 corruption cases.⁹ Every year and of course as the democratic party approaches, be it general elections or regional elections, in these agencies there is an increase in cases. Furthermore, the Corruption Eradication Commission noted that from the handling of Corruption Crimes for the period 2004 to March 2021, 93 of the 1140 suspects or 8.12% were BUMD officials.¹⁰

The large number of BUMDs with quite large assets and profits, accompanied by data on corruption cases in the aforementioned agencies, is a record that raises concerns that in the future, similar cases will occur again. Moreover, currently, there are 545 regions in Indonesia that will hold regional elections in 2024, with details; 37 provinces (Selection of Candidates for Governor and Deputy Governor), 508 districts/cities (Selection of Candidates for Regent and Deputy Regent as well as Candidates for Mayor and Deputy Mayor).¹¹ This means that, based on several indicators, the potential for political corruption in the 2024 regional elections will be even greater, and BUMDs in various regions will have the potential to become barns for corruptors to carry out their actions, in order to win the contest.

Efforts to Prevent and Eradicate Political Corruption

There are three important things to do to prevent and eradicate political corruption in the current regional election process. First, there is budget transparency, both in the management of BUMD in various regions and transparency in the funds of political parties and candidates who will run in regional elections. Budget openness will be important in terms of early prevention of political corruption. Second, namely law enforcement that is truly carried out professionally. Good law enforcement is the main factor in eradicating corruption.

The final point which is no less important is community participation which will play a role in preventing and eradicating political corruption in various regions. The role of the community is one of the mandates of statutory regulations, for example in PP no. 43 of 2018 concerning Procedures for Implementing Community Participation and Giving Awards in the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption Crimes. The role of the community in fostering an anti-corruption culture, healthy and dignified politics as well as efforts to report suspected corruption and violations in the implementation of regional elections are factors that are no less important so that political corruption can be eroded little by little. This means that collaboration with various elements is needed to prevent political corruption in the 2024 regional elections, especially in the area of ​​regional companies, from being overcome together.

Penulis adalah Praktisi Hukum dan Pegiat Demokrasi yang saat ini berdomisili di Jakarta. Pria kelahiran Majene, Sulawesi Barat ini memperoleh gelar sarjananya pada Fakultas Hukum Universitas Muslim Indonesia Makassar tahun 2015 serta gelar magisternya di Fakultas Hukum Universitas Trisakti Jakarta tahun 2023. Pada tahun 2019, Ia pernah mengikuti pelatihan internasional mengenai Bisnis dan Hak Asasi Manusia di Chiang Mai, Thailand. Sebelumnya, Ia pernah menjadi peneliti di Anti Corruption Committee (ACC) Sulawesi serta menjadi Advokat Publik di Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Pers Jakarta. Saat ini, Ia fokus menjalankan profesinya sebagai advokat dan peneliti dan menulis di jurnal, baik nasional maupun internasional serta di berbagai media massa di Indonesia.

The author is a Legal Practitioner and Democracy Activist who currently lives in Jakarta. This man, born in Majene, West Sulawesi, obtained his bachelor's degree at the Faculty of Law, Indonesian Muslim University, Makassar in 2015 and his master's degree at the Faculty of Law, Trisakti University, Jakarta, in 2023. In 2019, he attended international training on Business and Human Rights in Chiang Mai, Thailand. Previously, he was a researcher at the Sulawesi Anti-Corruption Committee (ACC) and a Public Advocate at the Jakarta Press Legal Aid Institute (LBH). Currently, he is focused on carrying out his profession as an advocate and researcher and writing in journals, both national and international as well as in various mass media in Indonesia.

[1] Robin Hodess, Introduction. Dalam Transparency International. 2004. Global Corruption Report 2004. Special Focus: Political Corruption. (London, Sterling VA: Pluto Press & Transparency International, London, Sterling VA, 2004), sebagaimana dikutip dalam Danang Widoyoko, Oligarki dan Korupsi Politik Indonesia (Strategi Memutus Oligarki dan Reproduksi Korupsi Politik), (Malang: Setara Press, 2013), 13.

[2]Artidjo Alkostar, Korupsi Politik di Negara Modern, (Yogyakarta: FH UII Press, 2008), 19.

[3] Nessmacher, Karl Heinz (ed), Foundations for Democracy. Approaches to Comparative Political Finance. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 9 sebagaimana dikutip pada Danang Widoyoko,Op. cit, 11

[4] Theodore M. Smith, Korupsi, Tradisi dan Perubahan di Indonesia, dalam Mochtar Lubis dan James C. Scott (Penyunting), Korupsi Politik, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1990), 63.

[5] Mimi Kartika, ICW: Ada Relevansi Antara Korupsi dan Pilkada, (republika.co.id), 15 Oktober 2020, diakses 03 Juli 2024. https://republika.co.id/berita/qi8how428/icw-ada-relevansi-antara-korupsi-dan-pilkada.

[6] ICW, Outlook Korupsi Politik 2018: Ancaman Korupsi di Balik Pemilu 2018 dan 2019, (Jakarta: ICW, 2018), 2. https://antikorupsi.org/sites/default/files/dokumen/outlook_korupsi_politik_2018_110118.pdf.

[7] Badan Pusat Statistik, Statistik Keuangan Badan Usaha Milik Negara dan Badan Usaha Milik Daerah 2022, Volume 15, 2023, (Jakarta: BPS, 2023), 47.

[8] Ibid., 50.

[9] KPK, Statistik TPK Berdasarkan Instansi, (kpk.go.id), 22 Januari 2024, diakses 03 Juli 2024.  https://www.kpk.go.id/id/statistik/penindakan/tpk-berdasarkan-instansi

[10] Mochamad Januar Rizki, Marak Kasus Korupsi BUMD, Ini Langkah Antisipasi yang Harus Dilakukan, (hukumonline.com), 9 September 2021, diakses 03 Juli 2024. https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/marak-kasus-korupsi-bumd--ini-langkah-antisipasi-yang-harus-dilakukan-lt631a46d41ed05/?page=1.

[11] Widhia Arum Wibawana, Berapa Daerah yang Ikut Pilkada Serentak 2024? Simak Daftarnya, (news.detik.com), 25 April 2024, diakses 03 Juli 2024. https://news.detik.com/pemilu/d-7310656/berapa-daerah-yang-ikut-pilkada-serentak-2024-simak-daftarnya#:~:text=Menurut%20laporan%20data%20dari%20KPU,pada%20Rabu%2C%2027%20November%202024.